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Abstract. FRIENDS is a software-based architecture for implementing fault-
tolerant and, to some extent, secure applications. This architecture is composed
of sub-systems and libraries of metaobjects. Transparency and separation of
concerns is provided not only to the application programmer but also to the
programmers implementing metaobjects for fault tolerance, secure
communication and distribution. Common services required for implementing
metaobjects are provided by the sub-systems. Metaobjects are implemented
using object-oriented techniques and can be reused and customised according to
the application needs, the operational environment and its related fault
assumptions. Flexibility is increased by a recursive use of metaobjects.
Examples and experiments are also described.
1 Introduction
The dependability research community has designed and experimented a number of
mechanisms which have now reached full maturity. Nevertheless, in practice, the integration of
such mechanisms within applications still raises several problems. A flexible implementation of
dependable applications requires the following properties: transparency of the mechanisms for
the application programmer; independence of the mechanisms with respect to each other;
composability of mechanisms on a case-by-case basis; reusability of existing mechanisms to
derive new ones.
None of the solutions traditionally used manages to ensure all these properties at the same time.
The approach which is developed and illustrated in this paper aims at providing a good balance
among the properties identified above. It is based on object-orientation, metaobject protocols
and also, to some extent, micro-kernel technology. The notions of reflection and metaobject
protocols in object-oriented languages [Maes 1987, Kiczales et al. 1991] emerged recently
and proved to be both efficient and elegant for the integration of application-orthogonal
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concerns in a highly flexible way. Among many other examples, PCLOS implements persistent
objects [Paepcke 1990], R2 allows inclusion of soft real-time constraints in object-oriented
applications [Honda & Tokoro 1992], Object Communities provides distribution transparency
[Chiba & Masuda 1993].
As some other researchers in the dependability community, we believe that the use of
metaobject protocols can yield the same benefits for the integration of dependability concerns
within distributed applications. This idea has already been introduced and used in previous
works [Agha et al. 1993, Stroud 1993], but needs more investigation in order to state on the
usefulness, practicality and efficiency of this approach to build dependable applications. This
paper describes to what extent metaobject protocols can simplify such an integration and
presents FRIENDS, a prototype software architecture to build dependable distributed systems.
Section 2 describes related work on the integration of fault tolerance mechanisms within
applications, describes what is a metaobject protocol and delineates what is expected from its
use. Section 3 describes the architecture of a system supporting dependable applications using a
metaobject protocol. Section 4 describes our application model and stresses the separation of
concerns obtained when programming fault tolerance or some security mechanisms1 using
multiple meta-levels. This allows the application programmer to concentrate only on the
functionalities of its program. Section 5 illustrates and discusses this approach with examples
of application objects and metaobjects. Section 6 discusses the identified advantages and limits
of this approach. Section 7 briefly sketches out our experiments.
2 Problem Statement and Metaobject Protocols
2 .1 Related Work
The approach presented in this paper is an evolution, with more flexibility in mind, of previous
work on the integration of fault tolerance mechanisms within distributed systems, either at the
system level through system services or at the user level through the use of libraries.
System Approach.   When fault tolerance mechanisms are embedded in the underlying runtime
system they are (almost) transparent to the application programmer. For example the system
Delta-4 [Powell 1994] offers several replication protocols based on a multicast communication
system supporting error detection and voting protocols. The communication system is based on
fail-silent specialised hardware components, i.e. network attachment controllers. This approach
inherently lacks flexibility in particular concerning the replication protocols which are
embedded within the system. Another drawback of this approach is composability of various
mechanisms dealing with various fault classes. Adding various types of mechanisms to the
application on a case-by-case basis, for instance client-server authentication, is not easy.
Library Approach.   Pre-defined libraries of basic mechanisms enable more flexibility to be
obtained in the sense that users can tailor their own fault tolerance mechanisms to suit their
needs by using constructs and primitives from some library. Thus Isis [Birman 1985] offers
1 In this paper, the term “security” must mainly be understood as “secure communication”.
the coordinator-cohort software construct, group management and atomic broadcast primitives
on top of which primary/backup and active replication for example can be built. In this
approach it is the programmer's responsibility to use library functions at appropriate places to
implement a given fault tolerance mechanism, which may require a good knowledge of fault
tolerance techniques.
The object-oriented development of such libraries provides the user with classes rather than
functions. Inheritance then makes it easier to adapt fault tolerance mechanisms to specific needs
or to add new features. Examples of such a use of inheritance can be found in Avalon/C++
[Detlefs et al. 1988] and Arjuna [Shrivastava et al. 1991].
So on one hand, a system approach provides transparency and on the other hand object-
oriented libraries provide reusability, but none of these approaches manages to combine both
properties. As a matter of fact, a careful observation of the code written by library users reveals
that functions are used almost systematically in dedicated places such as object creation and
deletion, beginning and ending of methods. This is the kind of problem a metaobject protocol
can solve in an elegant way.
2 .2 Metaobject Protocols
The essence of metaobject protocols (MOP) is to give to the user the ability to adjust the
language implementation to suit its particular needs. Metaobject protocols are based on
reflection [Maes 1987] and object-orientation. Reflection exposes the language implementation
at a high level of abstraction, making it understandable for the user while preserving the
efficiency and portability of the default language implementation. Object-orientation provides an
interface to the language implementation in the form of classes and methods so that variants of
the default language implementation can be produced, using specialisation by inheritance.
Instances of such classes are called metaobjects. The notion of protocol relates here to the
interaction between object and metaobject. In class-based reflective languages, this interface
generally comprises at least instance creation and deletion, attribute read or write access,
method call.
An a priori argument at the expenses of reflection-based languages and metaobject protocols is
that they are not efficient. A counter-example is ABCL/R2, an object-oriented concurrent
reflective language that in terms of performance compares with C used with lightweight
processes [Masuhara et al. 1992].
2 .3 Using a Metaobject Protocol for Dependability
The ability to adapt some aspects of the language implementation can be delegated to a third
party rather than the user, e.g. a fault tolerance or security specialist. In this way, a clean
separation of concerns between the application and mechanisms for fault tolerance or secure
communication can be achieved. This approach enables the role of different programmers with
a different basic knowledge to be clearly identified and made easier: the application
programmer, the fault tolerance programmer, the security programmer, the distribution
programmer. All of them share the same knowledge of object-oriented programming and some
about metaobject protocols.
In the present paper a recursive use of metaobjects is investigated so that addition of some
dependability-related mechanism takes place in a simple and convenient conceptual framework:
a specific programmer only deals with the mechanisms he is responsible for and their
implementation using the underlying object model.
Nevertheless metaobject protocols are not a panacea and it is not claimed here that they can be
used on their own to build dependable distributed systems. Several basic services must be
implemented at the system level, like error detection (to ensure high asymptotic coverage of the
failure mode assumptions [Powell 1992]) or a security kernel (that must be always invoked
and tamper proof). Other system services like group management and atomic multicast
protocols, authentication and authorisation servers are also necessary. The respective roles of
metaobjects and system services in the presence of multiple mechanisms are discussed in
Section 3.
2 .4 Motivations and Previous Work
In our previous work [Fabre et al. 1995], the use of metaobjects for implementing fault
tolerance mechanisms was experimented with only one meta-level. Several metaobjects classes
for various replication strategies were developed and experimented with simple application
examples. This was very promising and showed that transparency and separation of concerns
could be obtained for the application programmer.
However, a single-level approach suffers from several drawbacks. First of all, the interaction
between replicas at the meta-level was rather complex because of the use of system calls to
group management services. Likewise, remote interaction between application objects was
implemented at the base-level and thus very dependent on the communication mechanisms
used. A second problem was the difficulty to add transparently some security aspects
(authentication, ciphering and signature checking). All security-related statements would have
been mixed in the source code with fault tolerance and group management aspects.
In both cases, problems arise from the fact that remote interaction or security are not handled as
separate and independent abstractions, which also limited very much the flexibility and the
reusability of metaobjects that were initially developed. The separation of abstractions improves
the flexibility of the approach and the recursive use of several meta-levels allows composability
to be exploited as much as possible.
3 System Architecture and Assumptions
The architecture of the system is composed of several layers: (i) the kernel layer which can be
either a Unix kernel or better a micro-kernel, such as Chorus [Rozier et al. 1990], (ii) the
system layer composed of several dedicated sub-systems, one for each abstraction, and finally
(iii) the user layer dedicated to the implementation of applications.
3 .1 System Layer
The system layer is organised as a set of sub-systems. In micro-kernel technology a sub-
system corresponds to a set of services implementing any software system, for instance an
operating system on top of the micro-kernel (e.g. Unix on Chorus). In FRIENDS each sub-
system provides services for fault tolerance, or secure communication, or distribution. Any
sub-system may be hardware- and software-implemented. The three necessary sub-systems are
the following:
• FTS (Fault Tolerance Sub-system) provides basic services mandatory in fault-tolerant
computing, in particular error detection and failure suspectors which must be
implemented as low level entities. This sub-system also includes configuration and
replication domains management facilities and a stable storage support.
• SCS (Secure Communication Sub-system) provides basic services that must obviously
be implemented as trusted entities within the system (notion of Trusted Computing
Base). These services should include in particular an authentication server, but also an
authorisation server, a directory server, an audit server.
• GDS (Group-based Distribution Sub-system) provides basic services for implementing
a distribution support for object-oriented applications where objects can be replicated
using groups. These basic services include group management facilities and atomic
multicast protocols.
Every sub-system provides basic services required by the mechanisms implemented with
metaobjects. These services can be seen as Software Replaceable Units (SRU). Using micro-
kernel technology, the system layer can easily be composed of the required sub-systems, each
of them using the appropriate SRUs.
3 .2 User Layer
The user layer is divided into two sub-layers, the application layer and the metaobject layer
controlling the behaviour of application objects. Some libraries of metaobject classes for the
implementation of fault-tolerant and secure distributed applications are implemented on top of
the corresponding sub-system and provide the user with mechanisms that can be adjusted,
using object-oriented techniques.
• libft_mo provides metaobject classes for various fault tolerance strategies (based on
stable storage or replication) with respect to physical faults considering today fail-silent
nodes.
• libsc_mo provides metaobject classes for various secure communication protocols using
ciphering techniques, signature computation and verification based on secret or public
key cryptosystems.
• libgd_mo provides metaobject classes for handling remote object interaction, which can
be implemented with groups. The combination of these metaobjects and GDS provides
a runtime support for distributed object-oriented applications.
We also suppose that application objects have a “deterministic behaviour”. Any method
invocation with identical input parameters will produce the same results on any of the object
replicas. Concurrency and other sources of non determinism within objects have not been
considered yet.
3 .3 Overall Architecture
The static view of the overall architecture of the system is illustrated in figure 1. The
implementation environment provided by FRIENDS corresponds to the whole set of sub-
systems and libraries of metaobject classes.
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Fig. 1. Overall system architecture
The implementation of any abstraction (fault tolerance, secure communication, distribution) is
thus divided into a library of metaobjects classes and the corresponding sub-system, thus
spanning at least partially the user and the system layers.
4 Multi-Level Application Model
4 .1 Distributed Application Model
An application is regarded as a collection of communicating objects developed using an object-
oriented programming language (currently C++). Any application object is mapped by GDS on
a runtime object, depending on entities handled by the underlying operating system (Unix
processes or Chorus actors). Each runtime object is not only composed of an application
object, but also contains one or several metaobjects within the same address space.
RT_object = {A, FT, SC, GD} with: A : application object
  FT : fault tolerance metaobject
  SC : secure communication metaobject
  GD : group-based distribution metaobject
The set of metaobjects depends on the properties that must be added to the application and
includes at least one metaobject, GD, for distributed interaction. Ideally, adding properties to an
application involves adding other metaobjects to the set. The notion of metaobjects set is similar
to the notion of metaspace defined in Apertos [Yokote 1992] and also to the notion of reflective
object tower [Masuhara et al. 1992]. Figure 2 below depicts our application model on a
distributed system configuration.
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Fig. 2. A distributed application using FRIENDS
Within one runtime object, the interaction between the application object and the metaobjects is
done through the MOP. The interaction of runtime objects is based on the client-server model.
For a given abstraction, this interaction is performed by two metaobjects, one for the client
behaviour and the other for the server behaviour: a protocol takes place between both
metaobjects. The application programmers just writes the application objects and selects the set
of appropriate metaobjects.
4 .2 The Multi-Level Approach
In order to solve the problems mentioned in Section 2.4, a three meta-level application model
was defined. Any (runtime) object is organised using several levels: the first level or the base-
level (the application object), several intermediate meta-levels (metaobjects for fault tolerance
and secure communication) and finally the last meta-level responsible for handling objects
interaction. This structure of the application implies a sequence of interactions through the MOP
as shown in figure 3.
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Fig. 3. Base and meta-level interaction
The minimal specifications of the MOP (see Section 5.1 for a more complete description) that
we need and that we have used are the following:
• object creation/deletion: some operations can be done when creating/deleting an object;
• invocation trapping: the method invocation semantics can be implemented in a different
way, e.g. as group-based remote procedure call;
• base-level access: base-level methods and attributes can be manipulated from the meta-
level.
From Single To Multi-Level.
Considering just one meta-level handling distribution, any server method invocation is trapped
by the client metaobject on the client side, an invocation message is forwarded to the server
side, this message is received by the server metaobject and finally the method is executed at the
base-level. This protocol is illustrated in figure 4 below. The implementation of an example
using this model is given in Section 5.2.
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Fig. 4. Using metaobjects for distribution
Considering now several intermediate levels, each server method invocation is trapped by the
next meta-level. This is recursively done until the last meta-level (GD) where an invocation
message is forwarded to the server. The invocation message is received by the server meta-
level (GD) and the invocation is propagated recursively through intermediate levels to the base-
level where the method is finally executed. This is illustrated in figure 5 below.
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Fig. 5. Multi-level implementation of the client-server protocol
This figure also shows the various underlying protocols between a client object and a replicated
server object. With this application structure any intermediate meta-level can be added or
removed quite easily, thus adding or removing the corresponding underlying protocol.
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Fig. 6. Multi-level implementation of the primary-backup protocol
This multi-level model is also used in the implementation of inter-replica protocols on the server
side. For instance, the interaction between the primary and the group of backup replicas is such
that the primary is a client of the group of backup replicas. The primary replica captures the
state of the base-level object and invokes transparently an update_state method of the backup
replicas (figure 6).
Intermediate Levels and Properties.
The order of levels may vary according to the properties that must be guaranteed. Except for the
last meta-level (responsible for communications) and the base-level (application object), a
permutation of all intermediate levels seems possible and sound. Although it could be done
from a practical viewpoint (similar interface of metaobject classes), this actually depends on the
expected properties that the final application should have. For instance, if message integrity
must be guaranteed (e.g. by means of signature computation and verification) also on
information added during methods invocation by the fault tolerance meta-level, then the security
meta-level must be invoked after the fault tolerance meta-level. If message integrity must just be
guaranteed on the application information during the method invocation (method and
parameters), then one would expect the security meta-level to be put straight after the base-
level. Suppose then that the intermediate levels are organised in the following order: the
security meta-level is put straight after the application level, then the fault tolerance meta-level,
leading thus to the following sequence (A; SC; FT; GD). When the primary takes a checkpoint
of the application object, the access to the base-level state should go through the security meta-
level. This implies that the security meta-level is able to propagate this access down to its base-
level which is not possible with the metaobject protocol that we use. Updating the backup state
would also be a problem because writing base-level attributes should go again through the
security meta-level. With the current solution (A; FT; SC; GD) and the simple MOP used,
reading or writing base-level attributes is easily achieved. Moreover, errors detected by the
security meta-level, such as authentication error after multiple retries, can be delivered to
security base-level, i.e. the fault tolerance meta-level which handles recovery actions. Actually,
according to the expected properties of the application, this is the only suitable sequence of
intermediate levels if both fault tolerance and secure communication are required.
5 Metaobjects Implementation Issues
The objective of this section is to show how objects and metaobjects can be programmed and
bound using a simple MOP. The transparency of the mechanisms for the application
programmer is illustrated by a simple example. According to the models presented in Section 4,
metaobjects for each abstraction are briefly presented in an Open C++-like syntax. Open C++
v1.2 [Chiba 1993] is the language used in our experiments. The role of the binding
declarations is defined in each case. We also illustrate how to build the object-metaobject stack
with no, one or two intermediate meta-levels.
5 .1 A Simple MOP Definition
The following simple MOP is used throughout the rest of this section: each object is controlled
by a unique metaobject and the binding is done on a class-by-class basis. The binding between
an application class A and a metaobject class M is realised by the statement: //MOP reflect A:
M. All metaobject classes inherit from the pre-defined class MetaObj and have the following
interface:
class MetaObj {
public:
void Meta_StartUp ();
void Meta_CleanUp ();
void Meta_MethodCall (int m_id, ArgPac args, ArgPac reply);
void Meta_Read (int var_id, ArgPac value);
void Meta_Assign (int var_id, ArgPac value);
private:
void Meta_HandleMethodCall (int m_id, ArgPac args, ArgPac reply);
void Meta_HandleRead (int var_id, ArgPac value);
void Meta_HandleAssign (int var_id, ArgPac value);
};
Methods Meta_StartUp and Meta_CleanUp are called respectively after creation and before
deletion of the base-level object; between creation and deletion, object and metaobject can refer
to each other. Meta_MethodCall is called when a base-level method is invoked: m_id identifies
the method, args packs its input arguments and reply is supposed to pack the results when
Meta_MethodCall returns. Meta_Read is called when an attribute identified by var_id is read
and value is supposed to contain the result of the read access. Meta_Assign is called when an
attribute identified by var_id is written and value is the value that should be assigned. Private
methods implement the default behaviour of the language: Meta_HandleMethodCall,
Meta_HandleRead, Meta_HandleAssign enable the meta-level to invoke a base-level method
or access (read, write) a base-level attribute, respectively. Finally, ArgPac is a stack-like class
that may contain all types of objects (including ArgPac objects). Figure 7 illustrates how
invocation is trapped and can be adjusted with this MOP.
void Meta_MethodCall () {
   ... do something nice ...
   Meta_HandleMethodCall ();
}
METAOBJECT
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OBJECT
my_method () {
   ...
}
BASE-LEVEL
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À
Á Â
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Fig. 7. Invocation trapping
Classes that are not bound to a metaobject class have the default class behaviour. This MOP is a
simplified version of the Open C++ MOP [5]. Nevertheless, any reflective object-oriented
language providing this MOP could be used instead.
5 .2 Handling Distribution
The idea here is to provide a set of metaobjects classes providing access to remote, replicated
and/or shared objects. These metaobjects use other classes, based on GDS, providing an
object-oriented interface to group management services. A server is seen by the client through a
local representative, a proxy. This proxy is bound to a client metaobject whereas the server
itself is bound to a server metaobject. The client_GD_MO and server_GD_MO metaobject
classes provide (almost) transparent access to remote groups of objects.
Client source code Server source code
class Customer {
protected:
BankAccount account ("Bob");
public:
Customer () {
account.Credit (1000);
account.Debit (500);
printf (account.Balance());
}
};
//MOP reflect BankAccount:
client_GD_MO;
int main () {
Customer client;
}
class BankAccount {
protected:
int val;
public:
BankAccount()  { val = 0; }
void Credit(int x)
{ val = val + x; }
void Debit(int x)
{ val = val - x; }
int Balance() { return val; }
};
//MOP reflect BankAccount:
server_GD_MO;
int main() {
BankAccount server("Bob");
}
Fig. 8. A client-server application using metaobjects
Figure 8 shows a simplistic client-server application example. The extra argument "Bob"
passed to the server constructor is a group identifier automatically transmitted to the meta-level
client_GD_MO and server_GD_MO constructors. It is used to identify the underlying group
dedicated to this service. Nodes where server replicas are created are declared in a configuration
file (notion of replication domain). The server is created on the appropriate nodes and shared if
different clients use the same identifier. The user only runs the client; then, the constructor of
client_GD_MO creates all remote server replicas when necessary. Likewise, the destructor of
client_GD_MO is responsible for the deletion of all server replicas. A simple service called
factory was developed in order to deal with the creation of remote objects.
The extra task of the application programmer just corresponds to some declaration statements.
To use an additional meta-level, say fault tolerance, the programmer only has to change //MOP
reflect BankAccount: client_GD_MO into //MOP reflect BankAccount: client_FT_MO
in the client source code, and //MOP reflect B ank-Account: s erver_GD_MO into //MOP
reflect B ankAccount: s erver_FT_MO in the server source code. The declaration of
metaobjects handling distribution is then delegated to the next meta-level. These declarations
may be inserted automatically as discussed in Section 6.
5 .3 Fault Tolerance
Several fault tolerance mechanisms have been implemented in the form of metaobject classes
implemented on FTS: a mechanism based on stable storage, primary-backup and leader-
follower replication protocols2. In most cases, from the fault tolerance programmer viewpoint,
the development of metaobject classes is done using the same class pattern. Figure 9 shows a
simplified view of the client_LFR_MO and server_LFR_MO classes implementing the leader-
follower mechanism [Powell 1994].
client_LFR_MO server_LFR_MO
class client_LFR_MO {
protected:
server_LFR_MO FT_server;
public:
Meta_StartUp () {...}
Meta_MethodCall (...) {
...
FT_server.FT_Call (...);
...
}
};
//MOP reflect server_LFR_MO:
client_GD_MO;
class server_LFR_MO {
protected:
server_IRP_LFR_MO Followers;
public:
Meta_StartUp () {...}
FT_Call (...) {
...
Meta_HandleMethodCall(...);
...
Followers.FT_Notify (...);
}
FT_Notify (...) {...}
FT_Recover (...) {...}
};
//MOP reflect server_LFR_MO:
server_GD_MO;
//MOP reflect server_IRP_LFR_MO:
 client_GD_MO;
Fig. 9. Fault tolerance metaobject classes
2 Only server failure is tolerated by these mechanisms.
The client class defines mainly how a method invocation is handled: Meta_MethodCall(). The
method invocation is propagated to the server metaobject using a simple statement:
FT_server.FT_Call(). The server metaobject is transparently invoked from the client
metaobject thanks to the use of the upper distribution meta-level. The server is declared as a
local attribute FT_server of class server_LFR_MO. This class is bound to client_GD_MO
handling the client behaviour at the distribution meta-level.
The server class holds methods for handling the invocation (all replicas execute the method in
this case) and the inter-replica protocol (IRp). The FT_Call() method is responsible for
handling the server method invocation at the base-level. This is done using
Meta_HandleMethodCall(). The FT_Notify method enables the leader to synchronise with
the followers by telling them that a given method was executed3. This is done after any base-
level method execution, by Followers.FT_Notify(). The followers are invoked transparently
from the leader, again thanks to the use of the distribution meta-level.
In all replication mechanisms, a replica crash is detected by FTS which in turn activates the
FT_Recover method of one of the alive replicas. In the example given here, if the leader
crashes then the FT_Recover involves a follower to become a leader and the creation of a new
replica within the appropriate replication domain.
Two declarations are mandatory: //MOP reflect server_LFR_MO: server_GD_MO and //MOP
reflect server_IRP_LFR_MO: server_GD_MO indicate that the server and the followers are
respectively bound to a server metaobject and a client metaobject at the distribution meta-level.
The latter declaration enables the leader to transparently invoke the followers during the inter-
replica protocol, as already mentioned. This frees fault tolerance metaobjects from handling
distribution problems such as remote creation/deletion, group management and atomic multicast
message passing. When implementing metaobjects for replication protocols, the programmer
only assumes that all server replicas receive the same invocation requests in the same order
even when the server is shared by multiple clients.
In this example, no secure communication level is used and thus fault tolerance metaobjects are
bound to distribution metaobjects. If such a level is used then binding declarations must be
updated accordingly.
5 .4 Secure Communication
The interface of metaobject classes at this level is similar to the class interface defined in the
previous section, as shown in figure 10. Based on this model, metaobject classes responsible
for the authentication of the client user and the computation/verification of signatures have been
implemented. Currently, authentication is based on the Needham-Schroeder protocol [Needham
& Schroeder 1978] upon client creation. Computation and verification of DES-based
signatures are performed upon every server invocations.
3 In the primary-backup metaobject, the method FT_Update is used instead of FT_Notify to update the
base-level state after each base-level method invocation. This method writes the base-level state of
backup replicas using Meta_HandleAssign.
client_SC_MO server_SC_MO
class client_SC_MO {
protected:
server_SC_MO SC_server;
session_key  SK;
public:
Meta_StartUp () {
// get SK from the
// authentication server
SC_server.SC_GetSessionKey(SK)
;
...
}
Meta_MethodCall (...) {
...
SC_server.SC_Call (...);
...
}
};
//MOP reflect server_SC_MO:
client_GD_MO;
class server_SC_MO {
protected:
session_key SK;
public:
Meta_StartUp () {...}
SC_GetSessionKey (...) {...}
SC_Call (...) {
...
Meta_HandleMethodCall(...);
...
}
};
//MOP reflect server_SC_MO:
server_GD_MO;
Fig. 10. Secure communication metaobject classes
On the client side, Meta_StartUp authenticates the client and receives a session key. This
session key is transparently propagated (in a ticket) to the server by the invocation
SC_Server.SC_GetSessionKey(). Within M eta_MethodCall, every server method
invocation is signed and propagated transparently to the server by SC_Server.SC_Call(). On
the server side, SC_Call verifies the signature and, if it is correct, the invocation is propagated
to the base-level by Meta_HandleMethodCall(). The base-level can be the fault tolerance or
the application level.
6 Discussion
According to our experiments, the approach presented here provides the expected properties.
The current support for applications is extensible by simply adding new metaobjects for fault
tolerance and secure communication to the provided libraries. As soon as the reflective compiler
is available on a new system platform, then most of the metaobjects can be easily ported.
Nevertheless, this involves porting the sub-systems on the new platform which is a more
conventional work. We have shown that the use of metaobjects was transparent to the
application programmer who is just supposed to be involved in some declarations. Actually,
those declarations could be done by a system configuration officer, independently and
transparently from the application programmer through the use of included files containing all
the //MOP reflect declarations at compile time. Conversely, application functionalities are
transparent to all types of programmers and the system configuration officer. As shown by the
examples, the metaobjects classes can be developed independently from each other and from
any use in application programs. The interface of these classes are similar and their public
interface is defined by the MOP, enabling classes from various abstractions to be composed
quite easily. Finally, the defined classes can be reused and specialised using object-oriented
technique to derive new variants of existing mechanisms. The design of the provided
mechanisms using object-oriented design methods is one of our current activities.
The limits and drawbacks that we have been identified essentially relate to the MOP that was
used. To overcome a problem due to the static binding of application classes to metaobject
classes, several names must be given to application classes defining the same behaviour. In
addition, Open C++ provides limited meta-information and thus application objects have not
been implemented using inheritance. Another point concerns the abstractions dealt with. The
organisation of the metaobject stack is possible because neither the security level nor the
communication level need to access the application level. This is not typical to these
abstractions and others, like soft real-time aspects, could be handled easily in this stack.
Nevertheless, if two meta-levels need to access the application level, then their respective
behaviour must be handled at a single meta-level. Another lesson that we have learnt from this
experience is that the order of levels in the stack, whenever possible, leads to different
properties. This must be carefully analysed when using several meta-levels because this could
lead to unexpected side effects as shown in the last part of Section 4.2.
In this architecture, the frontier between metaobjects and sub-systems depends very much on
the abstraction which is considered. The identification of this frontier was easier for fault
tolerance than for security. In the former, replication and other strategies can easily be handled
as metaobjects based on basic services that must be implemented within the underlying
operating system. In the latter, just secure communication are handled by metaobjects:
authentication protocol, signature computation and verification, use of any cryptosystem.
Those involve authentication services that are difficult to handle at the application level because
of their trusted underlying property. This property must be enforced by their implementation
within the operating system.
Several other problems are also not easy to solve but they are not, to our viewpoint, due to the
use of metaobjects (handling multiple replies, view changes are they to be considered as
failures, etc.).
7 Current Status and Performance Issues
7 .1 Current Status
Our experiments are done on an Ethernet network of Sun IPX workstations with SunOS 4,
using Open C++ v1.2. Several fault tolerance mechanisms (stable storage, primary-backup and
leader-follower replication) have been implemented using the multi-level approach presented in
this paper. GDS includes an object-oriented extension of the xAMp package
[Rodrigues & Veríssimo 1992] (version 3.1) and the metaobject library provides a support
for distributed applications. The library comprises several basic classes (handling
creation/deletion of objects, group registration and naming, message management, etc.) used
for implementing group-based distribution metaobjects. The size of the source code we
developed for all metaobjects libraries is about 10000 lines of C++. This does not include
neither xAMp nor libraries of cryptographic functions.
Fault tolerance mechanisms have been designed and implemented using inheritance.
Metaobjects using a stable storage approach have been implemented first, then a primary-
backup strategy and finally a leader-follower strategy was implemented. Metaobjects
implementing the leader-follower strategy have been derived from the previous one quite easily.
In both replication examples, the inter-replica protocol was implemented with a multi-level
approach. This is of course a key aspect of the implementation of all distributed fault tolerance
mechanisms. In FTS, the Unix file system is used as a stable storage service and failure
detection is performed today by means of station failure signals provided by the xAMp
package. Finally, a service manages system configuration and replication domains in a very
simple way.
A first version of the metaobjects handling secure communications has been implemented,
based on the Needham-Schroeder authentication protocol with secret keys. Thus, SCS contains
today a simple implementation of a Needham-Schroeder authentication server used in our
examples; this first implementation will be upgraded later on to be in accordance with the
Kerberos authentication protocol. SCS will be also completed with other elements: the highly
dependable authentication server that was developed several years ago [Deswarte et al. 1991]
will be soon included in SCS.
Sub-systems are not totally independent from each other and cooperate for several tasks, such
as failure detection, configuration management, stable storage. The role of the sub-systems is
also to hold some information shared between meta-levels, groups for instance. This could be
perceived as a limit of this approach, although this problem arises in any multi-layer
architecture. A distributed application for the management of bank accounts has developed
recently. All kinds of metaobjects have been tested with this application in different
experiments: first, only distribution metaobjects have been used, then secure communication
and distribution metaobjects or fault tolerance and distribution metaobjects, and finally fault
tolerance, secure communication and distribution metaobjects. These various configurations
were obtained by simply changing //MOP reflect associations between objects and
metaobjects at compile-time. In these experiments we have also simulated physical faults (crash
failure) and authentication faults (authentication error, session key expiration). Testing several
configurations according to various situations is still under way.
Porting FRIENDS to our experimental platform of Chorus-based PCs is one of our on-going
work. The xAMp package has been ported on top of Chorus and the Open C++ compiler is
currently being ported: as soon as it is completed, the libraries of metaobject classes will be
available on the Chorus platform. The authentication server previously developed at LAAS has
also been ported on Chorus.
7 .2 Performance Issues
At the time of writing no exhaustive performance measurements have been made. The cost of
fault tolerance and secure communication services in the context of a distributed application
based on atomic multicast protocols largely outweighs the extra cost due to the use of an
efficient compiled MOP-based language like Open C++. To substantiate this idea a first simple
experiment was made: the time spent in trapping invocations was compared to the time spent in
group communications (i.e. forwarding the invocation message to a group of 3 replicas). For
an invocation with 1 kb of parameters, the time for trapping the invocation is about 0.1 ms,
most of this time (80%) being used for packing the parameters in an ArgPac object. This
packing time is obviously mandatory in the client-server model, whatever the way the
interaction between the object and the fault tolerance mechanisms is realised. On the other hand,
the time being spent in forwarding the message to the group using the atomic multicast protocol
was about 4 ms and computation and verification of a signed invocation message was about 2
ms.
According to these timing values, one can see that the cost of the meta-level indirection is
negligible with respect to the cost of both group communication and authentication. Actually,
this is not surprising at all. Indeed, the trapping of an invocation corresponds to a C++ method
invocation, namely Meta_MethodCall within the metaobject. The interaction between the
application object and its meta-level (say the fault tolerance level) is thus nearly identical to any
other approach (library function calls, middleware system calls automatically inserted by an
IDL pre-compiler). Indeed, group communication appears to be the bottleneck of distributed
fault tolerance whatever the approach used for implementing such mechanisms. Finally, it is
clear that a more compact and conventional implementation can lead to better performance, but
this is the price to pay for flexibility.
8 Conclusion
FRIENDS stands for Flexible and Reusable Implementation Environment for your Next
Dependable System: its components can be reused and customised to develop a next version of
a dependable system. This environment is currently composed of Open C++, several class
libraries of metaobjects, the corresponding underlying sub-systems and multicast
communication protocols. A first prototype version is now available on a standard Unix
platform (SunOS) and later on Chorus. The first experiments have shown that the approach
used provides flexibility, in the sense of transparency, independence, composition and
reusability of the mechanisms implemented as metaobjects. Because of the compile-time
metaobject protocol used, binding of metaobjects to objects is static. A different implementation
of the same MOP interface would enable dynamic binding to be done, at the expense of some
additional overhead. Performance penalty is always due when new properties are required.
Our next activities first encompass the final development and testing of the first version of
FRIENDS and its use in a sizeable distributed application. Performance evaluation and a more
detailed analysis of the properties must be done now. Indeed, this platform will enable more
aspects of object-oriented technology to be investigated for the development of dependable
systems. Metaobject classes will be reused to derive new variants of existing mechanisms; for
instance, various synchronisation policies can be implemented according to the leader-follower
model. The identification of classes reused, the impact of modifications on other classes, the
knowledge required about existing classes for doing that job, are some of the aspects we are
interested in. Currently, the inheritance hierarchy has been produced with the BON (Business
Object Notation) design method [Waldén & Nerson 1995] using static and dynamic diagrams
in order to identify common behaviour among the mechanisms. The use of object-oriented
design methods in the development of metaobjects will be continued, in order to evaluate how
far reuse can be driven, when new assumptions concerning faults classes and the operational
environment are considered. Today, we have not yet considered the use of standard object-
oriented execution supports; the GDS sub-system and its companion metaobject library
constitute a home-made runtime support for distributed (group of) objects. The use of standard
object oriented layers will be investigated using COOL-ORB on Chorus, a CORBA-compliant
object-oriented layer on microkernel.
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